

ინოვაციური ეკონომიკა და მართვა

INNOVATIVE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT

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Received: July, 2019
Accepted: August, 2019

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უკრაინის საგარეო უსაფრთხოების პოლიტიკის ევოლუცია

EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECURITY POLICY OF UKRAINE

ABSTRACT. The purpose of the article is to identify the causes and factors that influence the changes in the content and orientation of Ukraine's foreign policy during the period of independence and the background to understanding the role and prospects of participation in these processes in the USA, EU member states and Russia. The novelty and value of the material presented is to establish a tight link between the effectiveness of introducing systemic socio-political and economic reforms in the country, the qualitative and timely implementation of the international commitments undertaken and the progress made on the path to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Considerable attention is paid to the differences in ideological orientations, foreign policy priorities of representatives of different country regions, the dispersion of the national political and business elites, and the lack of formation of civil society. The problem of the interconnection of the foreign and security policy of Ukraine has also found its place.

In writing the article, the historical and comparative methods, content analysis of the legislative and regulatory framework of Ukraine, as well as methods of abstraction and generalization were widely used.

The results of the study revealed: the significant electoral heterogeneity of the presidential and parliamentary elections which directly influenced the foreign policy orientations of the country; unstructured party system, lack of ideological basis; unsystematic and delayed implementation of urgent reforms in all spheres of public life which has affected the content and dynamics of European and European integration processes; the powerful influence of the oligarchs on the formation of Ukraine's foreign policy through parliamentary factions and mass media

As a conclusion: Russia's aggressive imperial policy contributed to the consolidation of Ukrainian society, the formation of a national identity and consciousness and made Ukraine's strategic course of integration into the EU and NATO irreversible.

Key words: foreign policy, security policy, USA, EU, NATO, CIS, Russia, European integration

ანოტაცია. სტატიის მიზანია მოახდინოს იდენტიფიცირება იმ მიზეზებისა და ფაქტორების შესახებ, რომლებიც გავლენას ახდენენ უკრაინის საგარეო პოლიტიკის შინაარსისა და ორიენტაციის ცვლილებებზე დამოუკიდებლობის პერიოდში. წარმოდგენილი მასალის სიახლესა და მნიშვნელობას წარმოადგენს მჭიდრო კავშირის დამყარება ქვეყანაში სისტემური სოციალურ-პოლიტიკური და ეკონომიკური რეფორმების დანერგვის ეფექტურობასთან, აღებული საერთაშორისო ვალდებულებების ხარისხობრივ და დროულ განხორციელებასა და ევროპული და ევროატლანტიკური ინტეგრაცია.

შემოსულია რედაქციაში:
ივლისი, 2019
რეცენზირებულია:
აგვისტო, 2019

მნიშვნელოვანი ყურადღება ეთმობა იდეოლოგიურ ორიენტაციებში განსხვავებებს, სხვადასხვა ქვეყნის რეგიონების წარმომადგენელთა საგარეო პოლიტიკის პრიორიტეტებს, ეროვნული პოლიტიკური და საქმიანი ელიტის დისპერსიას და სამოქალაქო საზოგადოების ფორმირების არარსებობას.

სტატიაზე მუშაობისას ფართოდ იქნა გამოყენებული ისტორიული და შედარებითი მეთოდები, უკრაინის საკანონმდებლო და მარეგულირებელი ჩარჩოს შინაარსის ანალიზი, აგრეთვე აბსტრაქციის და განზოგადების მეთოდები.

კვლევის შედეგებმა გამოავლინა: საპრეზიდენტო და საპარლამენტო არჩევნების მნიშვნელოვანი საარჩევნო ჰეტეროგენურობა, რამაც პირდაპირ გავლენა მოახდინა ქვეყნის საგარეო პოლიტიკურ ორიენტაციებზე; არასტრუქტურული პარტიული სისტემა, იდეოლოგიური საფუძვლების არარსებობა; გადაუდებელი რეფორმების არა სისტემური და დაგვიანებული განხორციელება საზოგადოებრივი ცხოვრების ყველა სფეროში, რამაც გავლენა მოახდინა ევროპული და ევროპული ინტეგრაციის პროცესების შინაარსსა და დინამიკაზე; ოლიგარქების ძლიერი გავლენა საპარლამენტო ფრაქციებისა და მასმედიის საშუალებით უკრაინის საგარეო პოლიტიკის ფორმირებაზე

დასკვნა: რუსეთის აგრესიულმა იმპერიულმა პოლიტიკამ ხელი შეუწყო უკრაინული საზოგადოების კონსოლიდაციას, ეროვნული თვითმყოფადობისა და ცნობიერების ჩამოყალიბებას და უკრაინას ევროკავშირსა და ნატოში ინტეგრაციის სტრატეგიული კურსი შეუქცევადი გახადა.

საკვანძო სიტყვები: საგარეო პოლიტიკა, უსაფრთხოების პოლიტიკა, აშშ, ევროკავშირი, ნატო, დსთ, რუსეთი, ევროინტეგრაცია

JEL Classification J21. R11.

Problem definition. The path of Ukraine to independence was accompanied by the overestimated expectations of citizens regarding the future pace of socio-economic development, the role and place of the state in the architecture of the international system. In the vote of the All-Ukrainian referendum on the matter of Ukraine's independence on December 01, 1991, 31 million 891.7 thousand citizens participated, i.e. 84.2% of the total number included in the lists. Of these, 28 million 804.1 thousand citizens, or 90.3%, answered "Yes, I confirm" to the question of the bulletin. A positive response was given by the population of all regions of Ukraine, regardless of nationality [1].

However, significant economic ties, first of all with Russia, high energy dependence on it, outdated industrial capacities and infrastructure, uncertainty of the foreign policy vector of development, a significant traditional dependence of the political and business elite, and representatives of the security structures from Moscow were not taken into account.

Such uncertainty as to strategic external targets was quite obvious, since Ukraine has long been deprived of its own statehood and is on the verge of two major geopolitical projects – European and Eurasian ones. The difference in ideological landmarks, foreign policy priorities of representatives of different regions of the country was also significantly marked out. The inhabitants of the central, eastern and southern regions which for a long time were the part of the Russian Empire and the USSR were focused on continuing cooperation with the former Soviet Republics while the citizens of the western regions which for centuries were incorporated into the Commonwealth, Austrian (Austria Hungarian Empire and Poland tended to Central European countries.

We should add to this a nuanced assessment of the prospects of Ukraine's independence gaining from the leaders of the key countries of the world (US, UK, France, Germany, etc.), skeptic attitude to the processes of state building

a significant part of the influential Russian elite, dispersion in the assessment of national interests and priorities of Ukrainian politicians and businessmen.

Analysis of recent research and publications. The content and prospects of Ukraine's foreign policy development were investigated and implemented by K. Gryshchenko, A. Zlenko, P. Klimkin, L. Kuchma, V. Ohryzko, P. Poroshenko, B. Tarasyuk, G. Udovenko, O. Chalyi, V. Yushchenko, A. Aslund, T. Kuzio. The foreign policy of Ukraine in the context of global and regional security was considered by S. Korsunsky, M. Kulinich, G. Rudenko. The influence of the oligarchs on Ukraine's foreign policy was analysed by N. Abrams, C. Bolton, J. Duval, M. Fish, J. Indik and others. It should be also noted that the activities and publications of the Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism" as a powerful network analytical centre in the field of foreign policy and international security, as well as the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after OlexanderRazumkov.

Identification of previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Despite the significant factual material, the causes and drivers of changes in the content and orientation of Ukraine's foreign policy remain unexplained and structured.

Purpose of the paper. The main purpose of the paper is to elucidate the causes of changes in Ukraine's foreign policy priorities, the role of these processes in the United States, the EU and Russia.

Introduction of the main material. The issue of Ukraine's independence, its future role and place in Europe and in the world became actual only in the late 1980's, in connection with the socio-economic crisis, the decline of the communist party system, the deployment of national democratic processes, the formation of the People's Movement of Ukraine, national-cultural revival [2]. However, not all Western leaders welcomed this idea. In particular, on August 01, 1991, US President, George W. Bush, arrived in Ukraine on an official visit. During a speech in the VerkhovnaRada of the Ukrainian SSR, he warned against the separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union and called the Ukrainians' desire for independence "suicidal nationalism." This speech came in the history under the name of "Chicken Kiev speech". The position of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, M. Thatcher, regarding the position the independence of Ukraine was controversial. However, on August 24, 1991, at the session of the VerkhovnaRada of the Ukrainian SSR, the independence of Ukraine was proclaimed. The Resolution stated that from this moment only its Constitution, laws, regulations of the Government and other acts of the legislation of the republic were in force on the territory of Ukraine, as well as the holding of an all-Ukrainian referendum and the election of the President of the country on December 1, 1991 [3].

After gaining independence, Ukraine quickly established bilateral relations with many countries in the world, although in Europe this process was rather slow. The first countries that recognized Ukraine as an independent state were Poland and Canada (December 02, 1991. Hungary joined the following day, on December 04 it as Lithuania, Latvia, December 05 – Russia, Bulgaria, Slovenia. It should be noted that almost until mid-December the recognition took place predominantly from former countries of the socialist camp or post-Soviet republics. [4] However, for almost one month (December 1991), 74 states recognized the independence of Ukraine.

The foreign policy of Ukraine began to form under the tangible influence of two external factors. The impact of the EU (to a lesser extent NATO) was carried out through the so-called "soft power" (engagement, positive examples, financial assistance, capacity building, etc.). Russia used mainly "hard power" (negative pressure and coercion, mainly due to unequal energy and trade interdependence) [5]. Thus, Ukraine's foreign policy guidelines from the outset saw two main directions: a pro-Western policy, with the prospect of membership in European and Euro-Atlantic alliances with appropriate economic agreements and the so-called multi-vector policy aimed at maintaining a balance between the West and the East.

The first president of Ukraine, L. Kravchuk (1991-1994), was strategically oriented to the West and saw the future of Ukraine as a member of the EU and NATO. The European choice of Ukraine has become a top priority since the adoption of the Resolution of the VerkhovnaRada of Ukraine "On the Main Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine" of July 02, 1993 [6]. In section 3.2. it is noted that the foreign policy efforts of Ukraine should be constantly aimed at

the development of European regional cooperation in all spheres with the aim of strengthening its state independence and effectively ensuring national interests. Ukraine will increase its participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the North Atlantic Assembly. Ukraine will promote the development of trends in the gradual transformation of these institutions into elements of a new system of pan-European security in conjunction with the Helsinki process. Ukraine will strive to become a full member of the Council of Europe in the near future and a party to the most important multilateral conventions developed under the auspices of this authoritative and influential international regional institution.

However, in subsection 3.1.a it was argued that in connection with the peculiarities of historical development and the specifics of the geopolitical and geo-economic situation of Ukraine, the dominant bilateral relations with the border states are Ukrainian-Russian relations. For Ukraine, they are the relations of a special partnership because their nature will largely depend on the fate of progressive democratic development of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, stability in Europe and throughout the world. It is no accident that on December 08, 1991, the Highest-Level Leaders of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States which for Ukraine came into force by Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on December 10, 1991.

Ultimately, the priority choice of European integration, first of all, was conditioned by contextual factors. In the early 1990's it was not entirely clear whether Russia would finally accept Ukraine's independence. This period was also characterized by intense discussions about the territories, especially the role and place of Sevastopol as the base of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.

As long as in 1992, Kyiv joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (since May 1997 - the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council). The next signing step was the signing at NATO's Madrid Summit in July, 1997 of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine [7]. It contained political commitments of the parties at the highest level, deepened the dialogue between Ukraine and the Allies on a wide range of security issues which facilitated the establishment of a consultative body – the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

However, one of the key aspects of the formation of Ukraine's foreign policy in the conditions of independence and implementation of the strategy of subjectivity in international relations was a course on nuclear-free status. It was it that was supposed to strengthen the international situation of Ukraine. At the time of independence, in the territory of Ukraine, there were 222 units of deployed means of strategic offensive weapons, including 130 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) PC-18 (SS-19), 46 intercontinental ballistic missiles PC-22 (SS-24), 46 heavy bombers equipped with long-range airborne cruise missiles. In the opinion of Foreign Minister of that time, A. Zlenko, the nuclear disarmament depended not only on Ukraine's national security, but also on the ability of our state to take a place among the civilized powers of the world and to participate in integrational associations. The situation was complicated by the fact that, despite the advantageous geopolitical situation, Ukraine, after the collapse of the USSR, remained terra incognita for the international community, Kyiv had no reliable partners, and the diplomatic struggle for asserting its independence was only beginning. The young independent state was vital for economic and political support for reforms [8, pp. 323-325].

As a result of the difficult negotiation process, Ukraine was faced with a choice between preserving nuclear potential and the actual isolation from the West which in the context of aggravation of relations with Russia could lead to loss of economic independence [9]. The stiff position of Moscow and the impatience of Western countries led to the exchange of ratifications on the START-1 Treaty on December 05, 1994 during the Budapest Summit of the OSCE. This meant that the document came into force and its practical implementation by the parties began. In this document, the four nuclear powers acted as guarantors of the national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, undertook to refrain from economic pressure aimed at subjugating their own interests to Ukraine's enjoyment of the

rights inherent in its sovereignty and thereby gaining any benefits. Moreover, the United States, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom undertook to seek immediate action by the Security Council if Ukraine would be the victim of an act of aggression.

Today, sometimes there are again the discussions about the possibility of Ukraine retaining nuclear status at that time. We believe that taking into account the centralized system of management of the USSR nuclear forces, as well as the complexity of carrying out preventive and regulatory work of rocket and nuclear equipment, the pressure from many international organizations, leading non-governmental organizations and developed countries, this, from the perspective of today, seems fundamentally impossible.

The two terms of President L. Kuchma were characterized by pro-Russian rhetoric and the development of multivectorness. This term was included in political, scientific and media discourses during its first cadence (1994-1999). But in the second term of cadence L. Kuchma's foreign policy became more pro-Western [10].

A lot of scientific works have been written on this topic. So, E. Gnedin speaks of a great strategic "trade" between Ukraine, the EU and Russia. Such external pressure forced Ukraine to be doomed to manoeuvring between major world players [11]. Other experts, such as A. Dimitrova and R. Dragneva, talk about the competition between the EU and Russia where Ukraine is one of the main prizes today [12]. There is a large array of literature where analysis of the interests of big business is exposed. In particular, in the 1990's, owing to opaque privatization, major industrial capacities were concentrated in the hands of several influential business groups. Under these conditions, heavy industry relied on state subsidies, since market prices for energy made it uncompetitive [13, p.449]. Thus, a high energy dependence on Russia has been established. That way, it supported the multi-vector foreign policy.

However, over time, Ukraine's course on European and Euro-Atlantic integration has become stronger. Therefore, there are factual evidence. Ukraine became the first among the CIS countries which in June 1994 signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. However, we should look more closely at the reaction of the opposite side: it took more than four years for the parliaments of the EU member states to ratify it. And this is despite the fact that L. Kuchma relied on the electoral support of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine that were traditionally skeptical about the country's membership in the EU and NATO [14].

We support the conclusion of K. Shyrokykh that the finding of equilibrium in relations with Russia was seen as a critical condition for full European integration. During the 1990's, Ukraine prevented an open confrontation with Russia. However, in the scientific literature, it is sometimes considered that multi-vector can be deemed a constant of Ukrainian foreign policy, while it is mainly the tools of presidents L. Kuchma and V. Yanukovich [15].

It would seem that manoeuvring on a multi-vector has ended well. This concerns the signing on May 31, 1997 of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation which was ratified by the Law of Ukraine of January 14, 1998 [16]. One of the most important provisions of the treaty is the legal recognition by the parties of the territorial integrity of each other and the inviolability of the borders between the two sovereign countries. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the treaty on January 14, 1998, the lower chamber of the parliament of the Russian Federation – the State Duma on December 25, 1998, and the upper chamber of the Russian parliament - the Federation Council on February 17, 1999. Russia delayed ratifying this fundamental document of bilateral relations, until the Ukrainian Parliament did not agree to ratify the agreements on the military base of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea which opened the way for the entry into force of the Great Treaty.

Among the pressing issues were the following ones: the demarcation of the state border of Ukraine, that is, its delineation with the Russian territory; the distribution of the Soviet heritage, in particular foreign ownership, which Ukrainian people have a legitimate right to; the protection of the rights of own citizens in the territory of another state; the peacekeeping activities, in particular in Georgia and Transnistria; the competition in the field of scientific and technological developments of military-industrial complex (the struggle for markets of third countries, technology, industrial espionage from Russia, etc.). A number of problems in the field of culture and education can be added to this

list: the persecution of Ukrainian media in Russia, the closure of Ukrainian-language publications, libraries, the destruction of all Ukrainian versus the development of the Russian-speaking and all Russian in Ukraine, etc. [17, p. 15].

At the same time, in 1998 the “Strategy of Integration of Ukraine into the European Union” was adopted [18]. Its content was then further elaborated in April 2000. It provided for adaptation of Ukrainian legislation to European standards, protection of human rights, economic integration and trade development, Ukraine’s integration into European security, political consolidation and strengthening of democracy, adaptation of social policy to EU standards, cultural , educational, scientific and technological integration, regional, sectoral integration and cooperation in the protection of the environment. Therefore, the analysis of legislative documents and practical measures allows to assert that, despite multi-vector policy, European integration remained a priority.

At the same time, prospects for Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO were complex. This was largely due to the slow progress of domestic reforms. It concerned not only the obligations of the ruling class in the realization of fundamental values – democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedoms. The inconsistency of economic reforms also raised doubts about the ability to build a well-functioning market economy. This concerned the price and trade liberalization, entry barriers, property rights, relevant laws and transparency of contractual obligations, and the activity of courts.

Ukraine has constantly underestimated the need to implement the provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), and repeatedly violated its international obligations [19, p. 12]. As D. Sherr rightly pointed out, Ukrainian political leaders sometimes act as if they can achieve integration by declarations or mere affiliation and participation in international organizations and political clubs, instead of carrying out concrete structural changes [20, p. 12].

In spring of 2003, the gap between the desire for integration and the implementation of commitments became particularly apparent. The benefits of European integration have not yet been lost to the political elite, but it was not able or unwilling to implement the relevant reforms. This modus of integration which, in addition to external declarations, is not transferred into internal reforms, K. Volzok, in our opinion, very successfully named “declarative Europeanization” [21, pp. 2-3].

So, the question why there is such a discrepancy between westernization of foreign policy with failures and gross miscalculations in the implementation of internal reforms arises. In our opinion, until recently, the key driving force behind reforms remains the Ukrainian elite (political and business, which in fact form a syncretic whole). The society is in a state of separation for a long time, the vast majority of citizens are in a state of poverty and neutral (or indifferent) to the orientation of foreign policy and does not exercise appropriate pressure on political forces and authorities.

Back in 2002, according to large-scale sociological surveys, Ukrainian society was mostly ambivalent to foreign policy orientation, including European integration. At first glance, the population seems to be deeply divided about this issue. Most opinion polls at the beginning of the XXI century showed that one third of the population approved the pro-European orientation, while approximately the same share supported the reintegration with Russia or the CIS. The EU, of course, is attracted to the western regions, while eastern and southern regions are set to cooperate with Russia. At the same time, when it comes solely to European integration, 57% support EU membership (16.2% against and 26,2% have not found their position). In Western Ukraine, three quarters of the population favour the membership and only 9.6% oppose it. In southern regions, less than half of respondents approve integration (47% are “for” and 23.5% are “against”) [22].

Unlike ordinary citizens, the elite is much more united around integration into the EU. But it is also divided into motivations and the search for closer ties with Europe. For the “party of power” is a declarative resource for the utilization of domestic and foreign policy. But reforms, as a precondition for integration, encounter group and personal interests that do not encourage reforms. Institutional configuration allows the ex-nomenclature to control all important authorities. This contrasted very much with the profound transformations of other countries of Central and Eastern Europe which set on the path of internationalization of European values and political paradigms at the internal level. In

1998, Central European countries began a rapid move to EU membership 'Luxembourg Six' (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Slovenia).

It should also be emphasized that some other internal factors have a significant influence on the foreign policy of the country in addition to rapid and radical socio-economic reforms. In particular, it is regional heterogeneity. It should be added that, for a long time, it has caused sharp political competition within the country which ultimately affects foreign policy. In spring 2006, at the time of the pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko, after the regular elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the pro-Russian Party of Regions gained 32.14%, Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc – 22.29%, Our Ukraine – 13.99%, and Viktor Yanukovich was again assigned as the Prime Minister for 1.5 years which greatly strengthened his position in the upcoming presidential election in 2010, against the backdrop of the failures of the then acting authorities.

It is worth noting that the post-Soviet countries were characterized by some common features: a significant number of elites and the dominance of the executive (presidential) vertical power over all others. The communist elite retained its power, although it withdrew from the communist ideology and membership in the CPSU. At the same time, the CPU was the largest party in the country (with the exception of the ban in 1992-1993) until 1998, and attracted wide circles of voters. Democratic opposition was too weak to seize power. However, opposition and the authorities sometimes spoke together. This was the case when the threats to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, such as the separatist movement in the Crimea and the failure to recognize the borders of Ukraine, as well as the strengthening of the sense of national identity through symbols, language and historical memories, became worse. The threat of the red-back to power of anti-state, hard Communists who questioned the very legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, pushed democratic opposition into the arms of the ex-nomenklatura [23, p. 174].

In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovich came to the slogans to return to stability and order. In September of the same year, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine annulled the constitutional reform of December 2004 and reinstated the Presidential Constitution in 1996. The new law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine further strengthened the presidential power which began to control all the security chiefs and their appointment.

The experts believe that during the incomplete cadence of Viktor Yanukovich there was a strong russification of Ukraine's foreign and security policy. The repressive functions of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), observing politicians, journalists, public figures were significantly intensified. The people loyal to the President came to the secret service leadership – V.Khoroshkovsky, and from 2012 to 2004 – the citizen of Russia, I. Kalinin. In December 2011, the Law of Ukraine "On the Armed Forces of Ukraine" introduced the amendments that allowed the use of troops in the fight against the terrorists and the restoration of the constitutional order. In the same month, the powers of the SBU were expanded to investigate "mass riots", formed a new department of information security. Thus, it can be stated that in 2010-2013 all state power structures, including the Armed Forces of Ukraine, special services increasingly focused on ensuring the internal security of the state.

On April 27, 2010, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine extended the presence of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol (so-called Kharkiv Pact) by 236 votes "for", though, according to sociological surveys in 2008, 47% of Ukrainians supported the withdrawal of the Black Sea Fleet in 2017 and only 24% favoured the extension of their stay [24]. On July 01, 2010, with the support of 259 votes, the Law of Ukraine "On the Principles of Internal and Foreign Policy" [25] was adopted in which the non-aligned status of Ukraine was declared. At the same time, the conclusions of 2 out of 3 parliamentary committees dealing with security and foreign policy were ignored.

The Ukrainian tragedy of winter-spring 2014 is serious miscalculation in foreign policy priorities and the dismal failure of the security system, as well as the confirmation of the inconsistent policy of its provision. After the deployment of the "hybrid war" in the Donbass, it took more than a year to adopt the new Strategy of National Security of Ukraine on May 26, 2015 signed by the President P. Poroshenko [26].

Politicians and experts in the field of security and defence of the United States, Canada and the EU have repeatedly pointed out the lack of systemic reforms in the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (MOU) and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. First of all, it is about strengthening democratic control over the defence sector.

Of course, there are certain achievements in the foreign policy sphere. First of all, it concerns the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine on the one part and the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their member states on the other part of June 27, 2014, ratified by the VerkhovnaRada on September 16 of that year. Undoubted achievements of Ukrainian diplomacy include the acquisition of a visa-free regime with the countries of the Schengen zone on June 11, 2017, efforts to consolidate the international community in introducing and strengthening sanctions against the Russian Federation in response to the annexation of the Crimea and support for the separatist movement in the Donbas.

However, some EU member states do not provide effective assistance to Ukraine. It does not concern sanctions and diplomatic statements about the situation in Ukraine, but specific military-technical and humanitarian assistance. European states usually do not have a significant combat experience in their own defence. In general, in 2018 1.3 billion euros were spent for the Europe's defence targets which is much lower than the national defence budgets of these countries [27]. By 2024, all NATO countries should cross the 2% GDP ceiling, but this is unlikely to happen [28, p.22.]

In May 2018, the United States began training the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for Javelin anti-tank missile systems and subsequently their delivery. Total humanitarian assistance from Washington is 70% of the total assistance of all countries. As early as the end of March 2014, aircraft delivered 330,000 ration packs from the United States. Subsequently, body armours, medical aid kits, uniforms, tactical vest and armoured SUVs were added to it. In summer, 2014, the cargo ships delivered from Canada 32 tons of military aid worth \$ 4.5 million: helmets and body armours, first aid kits, as well as sleeping bags, tents and radio stations, and a bit later – a party of winter uniforms. Canada is now ready to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons, but not for free.

The reaction of the EU member states was considerably more restrained. 1,000 body armours has arrived from France. During the 2014-2015, the United Kingdom transferred 1,000 body armours, 2,000 helmets, 1,000 uniform sets, 200 GPS-navigators, 220 protected laptops, 500 sleeping bags and 90 car first-aid kits for the amount of nearly 2 million dollars, as well as 75 thousand tons of diesel fuel.

Much more tangible assistance came from neighbouring countries. In 2014-2015, it amounted to about 6.5 million dollars from Poland. First of all, they were ration packs, mattresses, blankets. Subsequently – the necessary spare parts for Soviet-style machinery. In the fall of 2014, Lithuania, like Poland, has also started to actively support Ukraine with medicines and medical equipment. But in 2016, it was the first and only one in Europe that began to supply lethal weapons. It is Lithuania that has provided Ukraine with 60 tank heavy machine guns KPVT and 86 heavy machine guns DShKM, as well as 150 tons of ammunition. And already in late 2017, Washington decided to supply Ukraine with defence weapons [29].

On the other hand, after 2008 (the Russo-Georgian War) and especially after the annexation of the Crimea and the deployment of a separatist movement in the Donbas with the support of the Kremlin, Ukraine's participation in the work of the CIS bodies virtually dwindled. In April 2018, the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko put forward a proposal to submit to the Council an initiative to terminate part of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as the Government's proposals to prepare recommendations on the termination of Ukraine's membership in the statutory bodies of the CIS. On December 06, 2018, the VerkhovnaRada of Ukraine, with 277 votes, supported the decision to terminate the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership (Great Agreement) between Ukraine and Russia. It expired on April 01, 2019. The Agreement on military-technical cooperation within the framework of the CIS has also ceased.

Conclusions and perspectives of further exploration in this direction. The foregoing points to the lack of systematic and consistent development of the strategy of the foreign policy course of Ukraine and its implementation. The ineffectiveness of domestic reforms, the sharp decline in the living standards of citizens, the imitation of fighting corruption, the low responsibility of the political elite for fulfilling international obligations, the scattered and unstructured political forces which are mainly funded by the oligarchs, the weakness of civil society, and other factors

hinder the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, the annexation of the Crimea and the separatist movement in the Donbas with the support of the Kremlin contributed to the consolidation of Ukrainian society, intensified the dynamics of the formation of an influential civil society, and contributed to strengthening international cooperation of Ukraine, first of all with the United States and EU member states.

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